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Delocation in the manufacturing sectors in the EU.  
A regional overview
M.ª Elisa Álvarez López *, Rafael Myro Sánchez ** y Josefa Vega Crespo *
ABSTRACT: The question of delocation in main industrial regions across the EU 
is approached here, and its effects on job losses estimated. Seventy five regions are 
selected following the double criteria of size of the manufacturing industries and 
high per capita income levels. Delocation affected half of them in the period 2000-
2005 when competition in the international markets rose and is of higher intensity 
in most of the British, French and Italian regions although its aggregate effect on 
employment seems to have been offset by growth in the other sectors. On the other 
hand, regions located in the continental area with more market potential have the 
highest concentration of location effects. Therefore delocation has changed the 
location of European manufacturing industry, benefitting those latter regions and 
perhaps bringing higher spatial concentration.
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Keywords: manufacturing industry, delocation, regions, European Union.
Deslocalización en los sectores manufactureros de la UE.  
Un panorama regional
RESUMEN: En este trabajo se evalúa la incidencia de la deslocalización, en térmi-
nos de empleo afectado, en las principales regiones industriales de la Unión Europea, 
confrontando lo ocurrido en cada una de ellas con lo acontecido en el plano nacional. 
Los resultados obtenidos, relativos al periodo 2000-2005, muestran que los efectos 
de deslocalización han sido especialmente intensos en regiones situadas en Francia, 
Reino Unido e Italia, en tanto que las regiones finesas y algunas de las alemanas y 
holandesas son las que presentan efectos de localización de mayor magnitud.
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1.  Introduction
Throughout  the  last  decade  delocation  of  manufacturing  activities  has  in-
creased very rapidly, mainly in the developed countries due both to a more glo-
balized and competitive international environment and the emergence of China, 
India and other big countries as new industrial powers with the help of a large list 
of multinational corporations which have been locating new plants in their territo-
ries since around 1990.
We give the name «delocation» to a process going beyond the process of moving 
companies offshore, as it also includes the closure of plants as a result of fierce com-
petition, following the idea suggested by Baldwing and Robert-Nicoud who defined 
delocation as «a loss of manufacturing jobs to trading partners» in the presence of a 
process of opening up to foreign competition (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2000). In 
our view, delocation refers to manufacturing activities as a whole, not only to compa-
nies exporting jobs, as offshoring does.
While offshoring of companies has received great attention from researchers in 
the last years (Antràs and Helpman, 2005; Olsen, 2006; Helpman et al., 2008), delo-
cation of manufacturing activities has not, perhaps because the latter is not shown as 
different from the changes in production and trade patterns deriving from extended 
international trade (Bhagwathi et al., 2004; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), or 
can just be considered as a special case of the location theory, now arising with the 
development of economic geography following the seminal work by Krugman and 
Venables (1990), Krugman (1999), Fujita et al. (1999) and Puga (1999) 1.
The aim of this paper is to measure the effect on labour employment of the delo-
cation process in the manufacturing sectors throughout the main industrial regions in 
the EU, from 2000 to 2005. As such a process affects each manufacturing section in a 
very different way, the branch-by-branch analysis is indicated but data availability is 
an obstacle to taking this path, suggesting instead an initial view at the aggregate level. 
Even with that restriction, it will be an important task to obtain the required data.
In order to register the delocation patterns in European regions this paper takes 
as reference those territories with a strong industrial sector, high level of economic 
development and homogeneous space dimension. So the sample contains only geo-
graphical areas at NUTS 2 level 2, whose industrial production represents, at least, 
0.4% of total EU manufacturing GVA and, at the same time, has a per capita income 
of over 90% of the EU-15 average. Therefore, they are developed regions that have a 
powerful industry at the Community level.
1  The relationship between new geography and location is summarized in Puga (2002).
2  The term NUTS corresponds to the French acronym for Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial 
Units used by the European Union. This classification has a hierarchical structure at three levels which, 
among other factors, comes from demographic thresholds. In particular, the NUTS2 level covers regions 
of an average size between 0.8 and 3 million inhabitants. In Spain, the nineteen units included in this level 
coincide with the different AACC more than Ceuta and Melilla.
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Consistently, the resulting list from applying to the set of EU-27 territories the 
three already mentioned selection criteria includes a total of seventy-five regions 
of thirteen Member States, distributed as follows: 23 from Germany, 14 the Uni-
ted Kingdom, 10 from France, 7 from Italy, 4 Holland, 4 Sweden, 3 Spain, 2 from 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Finland, 1 Greek and 1 Irish. On the whole, they 
accounted for 64% of real GVA in 2005 and almost three-fifths of manufacturing 
employment in the EU-15 (60 and 45%, respectively, taking as reference the EU-27). 
The complete catalogue of regions grouped by country and their characteristics are 
set out in Appendices 1 and 2. As is shown there, regions included in the sample are 
principally in sizes over 0.5% of EU-15 industrial production and above the average 
EU-15 per capita income, although a significant number of them lie below those 
le  vels, particularly in the per capita income. Looking more closely at the industrial 
size, we see that although most of the NUTS 2 examined move in around 0.5% there 
is a group of fifteen regions located in Italy, Germany, Ireland, France and Spain with 
a strong industrial sector (more than 1%), among them Lombardy, in Italy, with about 
4% of total EU-15 manufacturing GVA.
After this first introductory section, the paper is organized as follows. In a second 
section, the model to capture the delocation patterns is introduced. Then, in a third 
section, the data sources are commented on. In section four we try to assess the im-
pact of delocation in each region in terms of jobs affected and examine whether their 
location patterns have altered its position in the European industrial scene, contrasting 
country trends with regional performances. Concluding remarks round up the paper.
2.    Measuring delocation
As was posed in the introduction, following Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000), 
delocation of manufacturing activities has to be assessed in terms of losses of pro-
ductive activity within each region. The variables which approximate these losses are 
gross added value and number of jobs or total manufacturing employment. The first 
one is the most suitable, since the latter is dependent on advances registered in labour 
productivity, mainly in the face of strong competitive pressures forcing companies to 
achieve greater efficiency gains.
In spite of that, jobs continue to be a useful measure since their calculation is sim-
pler and is often more reliable. In addition this indicator has received greater attention 
and is more easily interpreted by the analysts and, especially, the social partners.
Nevertheless if evolution of jobs is chosen as a measure of delocation, it is nece-
ssary to discount the effect on it of an increase in labour productivity (which reduces 
the need for labour) and of the economic cycle (which may reduce or expand the 
existing employment). The remaining reduction in the number of jobs measures the 
delocation effect on employment.
Furthermore, when average values for quite a long time interval are taken, it is 
possible to ignore almost completely the impact of the cycle that, otherwise, would 
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be estimated using econometric techniques to isolate the trend. In this way, the delo-
cation effect can be just approximated after deducting the change in jobs caused by 
the increase in labour productivity. All in all, the possible incidence of the cycle on 
variation in manufacturing employment stemming from the evolution of industrial 
value will be seen.
Therefore, the change in total manufacturing employment may be split up into 
two effects, one of them due to the increase in manufacturing labour productivity 
and the other to a location effect —delocation if it is negative—. Box 1 shows that 
decomposition.
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In fact, the location effect reflects the impact on jobs of an increase or decrease in 
manufacturing value added estimated through the primitive rate of labour producti-
vity, and, as has been mentioned above, may be positive (location) or negative (delo-
cation). In the first case, an expansion in activity has taken place, while, in the second, 
a reduction of the productive scope has occurred.
Delocation of activities that can result from this calculation is compatible with 
the absence of offshoring companies, and it may be due, as noted above, to the clo-
sure of establishments as a result of their being uncompetitive. In the same way, the 
location of activities in a territory is compatible with the offshoring of companies.
Thus, analysis of delocation does not necessarily tell us much about the im-
portance of firms’ offshoring, a matter that has to be studied on a different basis. 
However, when offshoring reaches a large-scale dimension it affects the extension of 
manufacturing industries.
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Moreover, the work will also examine whether regions which have witnessed a 
fall in employment in manufacturing have been able to offset this loss by creating 
jobs in other areas of activity or not. Thus, the aim is to ascertain which regions have 
shown themselves to be the most active ones in dealing with delocation, either by 
replacing industrial employment by employment in other sectors, restructuring their 
manufacturing sector via productivity increases or both of these concurrently.
3.  Database
As was said before, to achieve aggregate data on manufacturing activities by re-
gions, even just those of real GVA and total employment, has demanded a laborious 
task of collecting information provided by Eurostat (REGIO database) and the Na-
tional Statistical Offices of member countries to which the different regions belong, 
as well as the estimation, in most cases, of the product in real terms.
Looking first at the GVA, since the data offered by REGIO include those related 
to energy and mining, only access to the National Statistics of every member country 
has allowed us to isolate the manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, additional work 
has been applied to transform the data of manufacturing GVA into real values, as 
only Germany, Spain, Finland, Holland and Italy provide such information or at least 
indexes of volume. In the rest of the countries real values of manufacturing GVA 
have been estimated by applying the national price deflators to the regional series at 
current values.
As regards total manufacturing employment, significant discrepancies between 
the data published by Eurostat and that country itself (particularly in the United 
Kingdom) are found, as well as the gaps found in several NUTS 2 of some Member 
States, such as in Germany, where they are obliged to complete regional series and 
correct such deficiencies with the help of the information coming from the National 
Statistics Offices.
To sum up, most of the information used, (especially production data), comes from 
National Statistical Offices, but this is commonly close to the Eurostat database, as this 
is constructed mainly with data coming from the regional accounts of each country.
Incidentally, one of the problems arising from taking the National Statistics as the 
main source of data is that the time intervals for which they provide information do 
not always coincide. That explains the fact that, despite having more recent data from 
some areas, the analysis must conclude in 2005.
4.    Delocation of manufacturing industries  
in European regions
As noted above in the introduction, the group of regions examined reached just over 
64% of EU-15 industrial GVA and about 60% of jobs in 2005, figures slightly lower than 
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in 2000. Thus, despite nearly half of regions’ industrial output at constant prices having 
achieved positive growth rates, the group accumulated throughout the period a decrease 
of about 1%, similar to EU-15 average 3. Regarding employment, the evolution has been 
even more negative. Throughout the first five years of the current century, destruction of 
jobs in the aggregate industry has been a common feature in the vast majority (90%) of 
the seventy-five NUTS 2 examined, as well as for each of the Member States where they 
are located, except Spain, accumulating the total sample a decline of close to 8%.
Focusing on manufacturing employment, the most dynamic areas are located 
mostly in France, Spain and Austria, while the Netherlands and especially the British 
regions show the largest job losses (table 1).
Table 1.  Importance of manufacturing delocation in European regions, 2001-2005 
(Decomposition of change in employment)
Regions
Number of jobs 
(thousands)
Percent share of 2000  
employment
Total 
effect
Producti-
vity effect
Location 
effect
Total 
effect
Produc-
tivity 
effect
Location 
effect
at22 Steiermark 3.72 –1.08 4.80 3.6 –1.1 4.7
at31 Oberösterreich 0.97 –8.37 9.34 0.6 –5.6 6.2
Austria –11.04 –26.49 15.45 –1.8 –4.2 2.5
be21 Prov. Antwerpen –10.10 0.79 –10.89 –7.0 0.5 –7.5
be23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen –7.50 –6.27 –1.23 –7.4 –6.1 –1.2
Belgium –57.40 –22.19 –35.21 –8.4 –3.2 –5.1
de11 Stuttgart –31.57 –82.44 50.87 –4.8 –12.5 7.7
de12 Karlsruhe –20.36 –35.85 15.50 –5.7 –10.1 4.4
de13 Freiburg –12.91 –13.01 0.11 –4.5 –4.5 0.0
de14 Tübingen –5.85 –18.05 12.19 –2.3 –7.2 4.9
de21 Oberbayern –16.30 –79.76 63.46 –3.7 –17.9 14.2
de22 Niederbayern –4.90 –32.70 27.81 –3.3 –21.8 18.6
de23 Oberpfalz –5.38 –17.16 11.78 –3.8 –12.0 8.3
de24 Oberfranken –19.57 –31.31 11.75 –11.6 –18.6 7.0
de25 Mittelfranken –11.84 –17.70 5.86 –5.3 –8.0 2.6
de26 Unterfranken –8.19 –31.57 23.38 –4.9 –18.9 14.0
de27 Schwaben –9.32 –33.35 24.03 –4.1 –14.8 10.6
de60 Hamburg –7.60 –12.22 4.63 –6.0 –9.7 3.7
3  It must be noted that the EU average has been calculated from the aggregate industrial GVA at 
constant prices of thirteen countries included in the sample. Thus, Portugal and Luxembourg have been 
excluded and the values from other countries have been estimated by adding figures of all their regions. 
So, the above mentioned growth rate differs from that provided by Eurostat, exhibiting a positive increase 
of 4,6%.
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Regions
Number of jobs 
(thousands)
Percent share of 2000  
employment
Total 
effect
Producti-
vity effect
Location 
effect
Total 
effect
Produc-
tivity 
effect
Location 
effect
de71 Darmstadt –53.43 –47.20 –6.23 –14.9 –13.2 –1.7
de73 Kassel –10.59 –13.96 3.36 –7.8 –10.3 2.5
de91 Braunschweig –9.47 –5.00 –4.47 –4.7 –2.5 –2.2
de92 Hannover –19.00 –15.44 –3.56 –10.6 –8.6 –2.0
dea1 Düsseldorf –62.72 –87.87 25.15 –12.6 –17.7 5.1
dea2 Köln –54.28 –49.71 –4.57 –15.0 –13.7 –1.3
dea4 Detmold –30.26 –31.12 0.86 –10.7 –11.0 0.3
dea5 Arnsberg –58.24 –55.02 –3.22 –12.9 –12.2 –0.7
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz –20.99 –30.16 9.17 –10.6 –15.2 4.6
dec0 Saarland –3.60 –18.10 14.50 –3.2 –16.0 12.8
def0 Schleswig-Holstein –18.67 –24.85 6.17 –10.1 –13.5 3.3
Germany –603.00 –1,122.75 519.75 –7.4 –13.8 6.4
dk01 Hovedstaden –13.00 –12.16 –0.84 –13.4 –12.5 –0.9
dk04 Midtjylland –20.00 –16.22 –3.78 –14.6 –11.8 –2.8
Denmark –61.00 –34.28 –26.72 –13.0 –7.3 –5.7
es21 País Vasco 18.40 –3.31 21.71 7.4 –1.3 8.7
es30 Comunidad de Madrid –10.60 –21.80 11.20 –3.1 –6.3 3.2
es51 Cataluña 6.60 –19.14 25.74 0.9 –2.5 3.4
Spain 139.70 –39.27 178.97 4.7 –1.3 6.0
fi18 Etelä-Suomi –18.07 –71.59 53.52 –8.6 –33.9 25.3
fi19 Länsi-Suomi –7.01 –38.86 31.85 –5.4 –29.7 24.4
Finland –17.98 –120.06 102.08 –4.3 –28.6 24.3
fr10 Île de France 126.52 178.68 –52.16 21.8 30.7 –9.0
fr23 Haute-Normandie –24.18 –10.93 –13.25 –17.1 –7.7 –9.4
fr24 Centre –20.16 –1.20 –18.96 –10.6 –0.6 –10.0
fr42 Alsace –24.89 –9.88 –15.01 –15.4 –6.1 –9.3
fr51 Pays de la Loire –2.17 17.94 –20.11 –0.8 6.7 –7.5
fr52 Bretagne –4.15 –2.15 –2.00 –2.3 –1.2 –1.1
fr61 Aquitaine –1.99 7.42 –9.41 –1.4 5.0 –6.4
fr62 Midi-Pyrénées 2.09 33.18 –31.09 1.5 24.5 –22.9
fr71 Rhône-Alpes –29.19 27.59 –56.78 –6.1 5.7 –11.8
fr82 Provence-Alpes-
Côted’Azur –0.97 2.62 –3.59 –0.6 1.8 –2.4
France –153.06 315.66 –468.72 –4.0 8.3 –12.3
Table 1.  (Continue)
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Regions
Number of jobs 
(thousands)
Percent share of 2000  
employment
Total 
effect
Producti-
vity effect
Location 
effect
Total 
effect
Produc-
tivity 
effect
Location 
effect
gr30  Attiki –3.60 –50.72 47.12 –1.7 –23.4 21.7
Greece –7.3 –119.89 112.59 –1.4 –22.2 20.8
ie02 Southern and Eastern –18.40 –99.85 81.45 –7.8 –42.6 34.7
Ireland –24.20 –122.74 98.54 –7.6 –38.7 31.1
itc1 Piemonte –68.69 25.39 –94.07 –12.9 4.8 –17.7
itc4 Lombardia –79.40 –76.82 –2.58 –6.3 –6.1 –0.2
itd3 Veneto –39.67 –2.11 –37.56 –6.2 –0.3 –5.8
itd5 Emilia-Romagna –8.60 –8.40 –0.20 –1.6 –1.6 0.0
ite1 Toscana –36.20 0.78 –36.97 –9.8 0.2 –10.1
ite3 Marche 1.64 –5.55 7.19 0.8 –2.8 3.6
ite4 Lazio –7.33 9.56 –16.89 –3.6 4.7 –8.2
Italy –217.61 63.10 –280.71 –4.5 1.3 –5.8
nl22 Gelderland –21.64 –25.06 3.41 –17.8 –20.6 2.8
nl32 Noord-Holland –15.55 –20.34 4.79 –13.8 –18.0 4.2
nl33 Zuid-Holland –17.34 –39.80 22.46 –12.9 –29.6 16.7
nl41 Noord-Brabant –35.39 –55.15 19.76 –17.3 –26.9 9.6
Netherlands –147.67 –246.90 99.23 –16.1 –27.0 10.8
se11 Stockholm –15.70 –41.83 26.13 –13.6 –36.3 22.7
se12 Östra Mellansverige –21.70 –23.87 2.17 –15.1 –16.6 1.5
se22 Sydsverige –10.10 –6.90 –3.20 –9.1 –6.2 –2.9
se23 Västsverige –4.60 1.34 –5.94 –2.6 0.7 –3.3
Sweden –75.00 –94.00 19.00 –9.5 –11.9 2.4
ukd3 Greater Manchester –49.00 –19.07 –29.93 –23.2 –9.0 –14.2
ukd4 Lancashire –46.00 –50.82 4.82 –31.7 –35.0 3.3
uke4 West Yorkshire –37.00 –11.92 –25.08 –18.6 –6.0 –12.6
ukf1 Derbyshireand  
Nottinghamshire –37.00 –49.65 12.65 –17.9 –24.0 6.1
ukf2 Leicestershire, Rutland 
and Northant –44.00 –36.07 –7.93 –23.3 –19.1 –4.2
ukg3 West Midlands –87.00 –49.99 –37.01 –31.3 –18.0 –13.3
ukh1 East Anglia –25.00 –12.92 –12.08 –13.7 –7.1 –6.6
uki1 Inner London –19.19 –13.81 –5.38 –14.2 –10.2 –4.0
uki2 Outer London –44.81 11.06 –55.87 –27.1 6.7 –33.8
Table 1.  (Continue)
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Regions
Number of jobs 
(thousands)
Percent share of 2000  
employment
Total 
effect
Producti-
vity effect
Location 
effect
Total 
effect
Produc-
tivity 
effect
Location 
effect
ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks and 
Oxfordshire –46.00 –38.98 –7.02 –24.6 –20.8 –3.8
ukj3 Hampshire and Isle  
of Wight –11.00 –6.89 –4.11 –8.1 –5.1 –3.0
ukk1 Gloucestershire,  
Wiltshire and Bristol –34.00 –12.53 –21.47 –16.9 –6.2 –10.7
ukm2 Eastern Scotland –11.00 14.02 –25.02 –9.1 11.6 –20.7
ukm3 South Western  
Scotland –34.00 –21.07 –12.93 –20.7 –12.8 –7.9
United Kingdom –898.00 –485.74 –412.26 –19.6 –10.6 –9.0
Source: Elaborated from Eurostat and National Statistical offices.
Registered unemployment seems to be related to good performance in labour 
productivity, pointing to the fierce competition faced by the manufacturing sector 
in the analyzed period. Thus higher job losses are found in regions with stronger 
labour productivity increases. However, some French and most of the British regions 
escaped from this rule, as large losses in employment are not accompanied by sig-
nificant gains in labour productivity, suggesting delocation effects of a particular in-
tensity.
That reveals a very different growth path in employment and industrial labour 
productivity by regions, differences which can be explored in more detail to isolate 
the attractive regions to locate manufacturing activities from the others characterized 
by a delocation process.
To go deeply into this latter question, table 1 contains the results of estimating the 
impact on total employment of location and delocation forces in the manufacturing 
sectors across the seventy-five regions included in the sample over the period 2001-
2005, by using the procedure proposed in the second section, that is, discounting 
from the total change in jobs the reduction corresponding to the increase in labour 
productivity. Therefore, the location effect shows the effect on employment of GVA 
change, calculated by applying the initial rate of industrial labour productivity.
In about half of the regions with job losses, all of those considered in the Nether-
lands, Finland, Greece and Ireland, three-quarters of the Germans, two British, two 
Swedish and Madrid in Spain, the decline in industrial employment has been due 
entirely to increased labour productivity, so a positive effect of location appears. This 
behaviour extends to Finnish, German and Swedish economies as a whole, as well as 
Greece, Ireland and Austria. Therefore, all those regions have proved attractive for 
the location of manufacturing firms.
Table 1.  (Continue)
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By contrast, thirty-eight remaining regions that also show reductions in manufac-
turing employment have been affected by delocation processes to different extents, 
although only in a small number of them have they been accompanied by decreases 
in labour productivity, which could make the prospects for economic growth tougher, 
(four from France; Piedmont, Toscana and Lazio in Italy, Greater London and Eastern 
Scotland in the United Kingdom, the Swedish Västsverige and Antwerp in Belgium).
Regions with positive location effects are shown in figure 1. Most of them are 
large industrial regions and are located in the traditional industrial growth cen-
Figure 1.  Regions with a positive location effect (% of 2000 employment)
Above 10%
0 to 10%
Source: Own calculation.
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tres 4, those characterized by high market potential (Combes and Overman, 2003), 
although there are also some intermediate and peripheral territories, mainly loca-
ted in the north of Italy, United Kingdom and Spain and in the south of Sweden 
and Norway. This means that the delocation process has contributed to concentra-
ting the European manufacturing industries in that privileged area of faster growth, 
apart from some other changes inside every country.
Now, to compare the intensity of such effects of location and delocation across 
regions, avoiding the differences they have in size, we built a relative measure of 
them: the ratio of job losses in the period to the volume of manufacturing employ-
ment in the first year, 2000 (table 1).
Following this ratio, delocation effects are revealed to be particularly strong in 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, and in one region of Belgium, with reductions in 
employment exceeding 20% in some of them.
Conversely, the regions of Finland and several of the German and the Dutch ones 
exhibit strong location effects.
In the cases of the British and Italian economies, as well as the Danish one, bea-
ring in mind that by 2005 they had not recovered from the industrial crisis resulting 
from the dotcom bubble (figure 2), part of the registered loss of employment in the 
4  Note that the map of winning regions is clearly influenced by the large number (30%) of German 
NUTS 2 in the sample.
Figure 2.  Real manufacturing GVA growth rates in selected countries, 2001-2005 
(Index, 2000 = 100)
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Source: Elaborated from Eurostat.
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manufacturing sector (around 2% in the case of the United Kingdom and 3.5% for 
Italy and Denmark) could be attributed to the effect of the cycle. Nonetheless, at re-
gional level, the heavy loss of employment seen in many British areas (Greater Man-
chester, West Yorkshire, West Midlands, Greater London and Eastern Scotland) and 
Italian ones (Piedmont, Tuscany and Lazio) indicate that there was scant incidence of 
the economic cycle in the drop in industrial production.
In any case, as was pointed above, the importance of location effects seems to lie 
in their manufacturing labour productivity gains. In fact higher increases in produc-
tivity (over 15%) are found precisely in those regions of Ireland, Finland, Sweden, 
Netherlands and Germany, besides the Greek Attiki, where the location effect has in 
general, reached its greatest extent (figure 3).
Nevertheless, productivity also grows faster in most of the regions belonging to 
the United Kingdom, Belgium and Denmark in spite of the strong delocation effects 
registered, which disturbs the above-mentioned positive relationship, suggesting the 
harsh process of industrial restructuring involved.
In contrast, the industrial productivity decline in half of the French and Italian re-
gions, albeit with a positive impact on employment, is largely offset by destruction of 
industrial activity, except in the Île de France and Midi-Pyrénées, the two territories 
in which productivity has a more negative trajectory.
These results closely match those reported by Cuadrado-Roura et al. (2000) 
based on the growth rates for regional productivity and employment during the pe-
riod 1980-1993, grouping European regions in four typologies comparing the growth 
rates of these two variables with their respective European averages.
According to this approach and including the location effect in the analysis, the 
group of regions that are examined in this work would be categorized as follows 
(table 2).
The first group includes areas with productivity and manufacturing employment 
growth rates above sample average and show positive location effect (quadrant 1). 
So, as has been underlined in that work, possibly this reflects the fact that the tech-
nological and organizational changes introduced during the period would have been 
successful, promoting the diversification and specialization in activities with high 
growth levels and attracting new investments which are less labour-intensive.
In a second stage are those regions which, as the above mentioned authors su-
ggest, have implemented restructuring processes to eliminate the most inefficient 
outputs, achieving higher levels of industrial productivity and, in about half of them, 
increased industrial production, at the expense of a notable decline in employment 
(quadrant 4) They named this typology «restructuring via productivity».
With a few exceptions (those where the location effect is negative), the regions 
in both groups are the winners of industrial dynamic during the period. Most of them 
are large industrial regions and are located in the traditional industrial growth cen-
tres. As demonstrated above, they are mainly Finnish, German and Dutch, as well as 
Greek and Irish regions.
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In contrast, another large group of regions, due to different factors (see Cuadra-
do-Roura et al., 2000), have opted for more labour-intensive industrial models which 
in a few cases (especially in Spanish and Austrian regions) have been accompanied 
by output increases, so they can also be included among the winners (figure 1), while 
in others the result has been a loss of productive activity (quadrant 2).
Figure 3.  Location effect and productivity growth in select regions’ 
manufacturing sector, 2001-2005 (percentages)
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Table 2.  Employment and productivity growth rates in select regions 
manufacturing sector, 2001-2005 
(Averages of all regions: 7.4% productivity; –7.7% employment)
Productivity growth > Average value Productivity growth < Average value
E
m
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l
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t
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o
w
t
h
 
>
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
v
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l
u
e
(1) Employ-
ment
Producti-
vity
(2) Employ-
ment
Producti-
vity
de11 Stuttgart –4.8 12.5 at22 Steiermark 3.6 1.1
de12 Karlsruhe –5.7 10.1 at31 Oberösterreich 0.6 5.6
de21 Oberbayern –3.7 17.9 be21 Prov. Antwerpen –7.0 –0.5
de22 Niederbayern –3.3 21.8 be23 Prov. Oost-
Vlaanderen
–7.4 6.1
de23 Oberpfalz –3.8 12.0 de13 Freiburg –4.5 4.5
de25 Mittelfranken –5.3 8.0 de14 Tübingen –2.3 7.2
de26 Unterfranken –4.9 18.9 de91 Braunschweig –4.7 2.5
de27 Schwaben –4.1 14.8 es21 País Vasco 7.4 1.3
de60 Hamburg –6.0 9.7 es30 Comunidad de 
Madrid
–3.1 6.3
dec0 Saarland –3.2 16.0 es51 Cataluña 0.9 2.5
fi19 Länsi-Suomi –5.4 29.7 fr10 Île de France 21.8 –30.7
gr30 Attiki –1.7 23.4 fr51 Pays de la Loire –0.8 –6.7
  fr52 Bretagne –2.3 1.2
  fr61 Aquitaine –1.4 –5.0
  fr62 Midi-Pyrénées 1.5 –24.5
  fr71 Rhône-Alpes –6.1 –5.7
  fr82 Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur
–0.6 –1.8
  itc4 Lombardia –6.3 6.1
  itd3 Veneto –6.2 0.3
  itd5 Emilia-Romagna –1.6 1.6
  ite3 Marche 0.8 2.8
  ite4 Lazio –3.6 –4.7
  se23 Västsverige –2.6 –0.7
01-ALVAREZ.indd   18 19/4/12   16:44:24Delocation in the manufacturing sectors in the EU. A regional overview  19
Productivity growth > Average value Productivity growth < Average value
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(4) Employ-
ment
Producti-
vity
(3) Employ-
ment
Producti-
vity
de24 Oberfranken –11.6 18.6 fr24 Centre –10.6 0.6
de71 Darmstadt –14.9 13.2 fr42 Alsace –15.4 6.1
de73 Kassel –7.8 10.3 itc1 Piemonte –12.9 –4.8
de92 Hannover –10.6 8.6 ite1 Toscana –9.8 –0.2
dea1 Düsseldorf –12.6 17.7 se22 Sydsverige –9.1 6.2
dea2 Köln –15.0 13.7 uke4 West Yorkshire –18.6 6.0
dea4 Detmold –10.7 11.0 ukh1 East Anglia –13.7 7.1
dea5 Arnsberg –12.9 12.2 uki2 Outer London –27.1 –6.7
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz –10.6 15.2 ukj3 Hampshire and 
Isle of Wight
–8.1 5.1
def0 Schleswig-Holstein –10.1 13.5 ukk1 Gloucestershire, 
Wiltshire and Bristol
–16.9 6.2
dk01 Hovedstaden –13.4 12.5 ukm2 Eastern Scotland –9.1 –11.6
dk04 Midtjylland –14.6 11.8
fi18 Etelä-Suomi –8.6 33.9
fr23 Haute-Normandie –17.1 7.7
ie02 Southern and 
Eastern
–7.8 42.6
nl22 Gelderland –17.8 20.6
nl32 Noord-Holland –13.8 18.0
nl33 Zuid-Holland –12.9 29.6
nl41 Noord-Brabant –17.3 26.9
se11 Stockholm –13.6 36.3
se12 Östra 
Mellansverige
–15.1 16.6
ukd3 Greater 
Manchester
–23.2 9.0
ukd4 Lancashire –31.7 35.0
ukf1 Derbyshire and 
Nottinghamshire
–17.9 24.0
ukf2 Leicestershire, 
Rutland and Northants
–23.3 19.1
ukg3 West Midlands –31.3 18.0
uki1 Inner London –14.2 10.2
ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks 
and Oxfordshire
–24.6 20.8
ukm3 South Western 
Scotland
–20.7 12.8
Note: Shaded areas indicate regions with positive location effect.
Source : Elaborated from Eurostat and National Statistical offices.
Table 2.  (Continue)
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Finally the worst results can be seen in a fourth type of region with growth rates 
of GVA and industrial productivity below average and serious job destruction (qua-
drant 3). This would occur in regions with problems in restructuring their manufac-
turing sector or with low levels of activity. So, together with those that are either 
restructuring via productivity or via employment, but without achieving a positive 
location effect, they are clearly the losers. These include mainly British, French, Ita-
lian, Belgian and Danish regions.
To sum up, these results confirm the direct relationship between growth in labour 
efficiency and progress in the creation of productive industrial activity as pointed out 
above, and which can be seen more clearly by looking at figure 3. In other words, 
regions with higher levels of productivity growth in general show a greater attractive-
ness for new manufacturing firms.
These differences in the behaviour of productivity and manufacturing employ-
ment across regions have led to remarkable disparities in rates of change of their 
industrial output during the period. Thus, while a few increased their real manufac-
turing GVA by more than 20%, in the less dynamic ones the loss of industrial output 
is between a sixth and a third of the initial value. So, significant changes had taken 
place in the relative position of some of them (figure 4).
Growth is led by a group of twenty regions located in Ireland, Finland, Greece, 
Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain and Austria, with real GVA growth rates that 
are more than five points above average. As a result they increased their share in the 
industrial output of the sample. Looking at the complete list, we see that the growth 
deviation from the mean exhibits positive values in just over half of the regions exa-
mined, among them seven of the ten with the largest industrial scale in 2005. Thus, the 
top ten regions have increased their share from 32 to 33 percent in the last five years.
Conversely, among the less dynamic regions are found a great number of British 
and some French and Italian ones, which, consequently, have fallen back in the ran-
king of NUTS 2 arranged by their contribution to aggregate manufacturing output.
Between both groups there are approximately twenty regions, mainly in Germa-
ny, with growth rates not far from the average, so their positions have hardly changed 
during the last five years.
Finally, when the question is analyzed at Member State level (table 1), it is po-
ssible to check out the disparities among the above mentioned regions. Thus, while in 
some countries such as Spain, manufacturing growth has been clearly labour-inten-
sive, something which can be extended to its regions, the same also occurs in Greece 
and Austria, which both boast positive location effect and a job destruction rate far 
below the average. In others, such as Holland, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Bel-
gium, Ireland and Finland, an increase in industrial activity is only due to advances in 
productivity, so it has been accompanied by heavy job losses, and these are patterns 
repeated in most of their regions, with noticeable importance in the Netherlands. 
As for the United Kingdom, Belgium and Denmark, all share declining industrial 
production together with strong job cuts, a pattern that is replicated in many of their 
regions. In this situation we find the bulk of French and Italian NUTS 2, just like the 
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countries to which they belong, although in this case, job destruction has been much 
less pronounced, and below the group average. Close to this mean is Germany, as 
well as most of their regions.
Thus, the analysis at Member State level also confirms the positive relationship 
between the advance of industrial productivity and the attractiveness for new manu-
facturing firms. As demonstrated for their regions, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands and 
Figure 4.  Regional shares in the total sample manufacturing GVA  
(percentage at 2000 prices)
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Greece, following at quite a distance from Germany, are Member States showing a 
better performance in productivity and with high location effects (see figure 3).
In fact similarities between performances in the regions and in the Member States 
they belong to suggest that the trend in regional industrial employment is to some 
extent influenced by belonging to the same country; in other words, the locational 
attractions of each area and its effort to improve productivity is partly due to national 
specificities, or idiosyncratic factors. In fact, as shown in Appendix 3, most Euro-
pean industrialized regions follow the location patterns of the country they belong 
to, reproducing its productivity behaviour, too. In summary, the evolution of these 
variables in each region seems to have a clear «country effect», that is, different be-
haviours motivated by specific factors and/or differentiated industrial policies.
For example, in order to correctly interpret the results for Spanish regions it can 
not be overlooked that during the period analyzed, as in the whole country, regions 
have absorbed large numbers of immigrants, which has boosted the proliferation 
of lower productivity and lower wages in industrial activities. However, it may be 
thought that this phenomenon has tended to conceal productivity increases in larger 
and better equipped firms; which could have been significant, in the light of their 
results 5. On the other hand, countries like Finland or Ireland, with the lowest popu-
lation increase, have opted for high-tech manufacturing sectors as a way to improve 
national competitiveness (see Álvarez et al., 2007). Nonetheless, this positive lo-
cation effect has not reached in’ NUTS 2 enough magnitude in these countries to 
offset completely the job losses arising from productivity improvements.
On the other hand, this «national effect» has also played an important role in 
explaining the economic outcomes of European regions in terms of per capita GDP, 
in accordance with the results obtained by Cuadrado-Roura (2001), using the data 
available for 109 EU regions over the 1977-1994 period.
This  importance  of  the  «national  effect»  should  allow  us  to  make  a  better 
  approach to the determinants of above-mentioned delocation patterns in future re-
search. One of these determinants might be found in the different importance and 
performance by countries of some manufacturing branches particularly affected by 
the increase in global competition as their development has being receiving strong 
support in emerging countries from both domestic policies and the location of big 
multinational companies. This is the case of IT manufacturing sectors or that of 
automobiles, clothes, textiles and shoes (Sachwald, 2004). Table 3 shows how the 
exports of these key sectors have evolved in some of the European countries con-
sidered here. It is amazing to see the poor results registered by IT sectors in United 
Kingdom, France and Ireland compared to the other countries mentioned, Germany 
in particular. This evolution could be behind the stronger effects of delocation in 
France and the United Kingdom although it must have produced similar results in 
the case of Ireland. Furthermore, on such a basis what has happened in Italy would 
remain unexplained as the selected key sectors do not show a bad performance in 
terms of exports in the latter country.
5  For details, see Myro et al. (2008).
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Table 3.  Export growth in key sectors by countries, 2000-2005 (percentages)
IT Auto Textile Clothes Shoes Total Impact IT 
on Total
Spain 6.5 9.1 7.2 15.8 3.8 11.1 0.4
Germany 11.6 13.8 6.1 11.1 11.1 13.0 1.4
United Kingdom 0.9 8.5 2.9 3.2 2.3 6.1 0.2
France –0.9 10.2 2.5 9.4 11.8 7.8 –0.1
Ireland –0.9 –10.2 0.1 2.5 –3.4 7.7 –0.3
Finland 4.7 15.2 4.5 4.9 5.6 7.3 1.3
Italy 4.0 8.8 4.1 9.0 5.6 8.9 0.2
EU-15 7.0 14.1 5.9 9.1 6.7 11.1 1.1
Source: Elaborated from Comtrade.
One reason for such contradictory results lies in the possibility that production 
instead of export reflects accurately what has been happening in every sector in terms 
of activity. However Álvarez et al. (2007) show very similar patterns in production 
and export specialization from 1995 to 2005 except in the case of Ireland, which 
thus appears as a very particular one. This is because IT specialization in produc-
tion increases at the same time as it decreases in exports. Perhaps the strong growth 
in domestic demand prevents IT exports from growing. The opposite case could be 
that of Italy, where slow growth in domestic demand might have been pushing up IT 
exports 6.
Anyway, further developments on the determinants of delocation patterns require 
the preparation of disaggregated data on production, a task beyond the objectives of 
this paper. That could allow us to update the available manufacturing specialization 
analysis. As the two countries exhibiting the highest delocation effects, France and 
the United Kingdom, showed the lowest rates of specialization compared with the 
EU (Milderfart and Overman, 2002; Combes and Overman, 2003). This suggests 
something could have changed in the last few years, which would merit a fresh look 
based on more recent data.
On the other hand, it is now clear that insofar as delocation in manufacturing 
activities has affected each country in a different way, a relocation process inside 
the EU and between countries has taken place. This process deserved to be deeply 
analyzed, including a perspective by sectors, updating what we know about changes 
in the distribution of manufacturing industry in the EU and offering the possibility of 
exploring whether the European Common Policy has influenced them in some way, 
as was already suggested by Milderfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002).
One last question that deserves consideration is the effect of the industrial deloca-
tion process on the regional economies. Surprisingly, manufacturing job losses have 
6  In Finland IT activities grow much more in production than in exports, but in both aspects a posi-
tive growth is registered.
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not been transformed into total employment which exhibits positive growth for all the 
regions included in the sample, with the exceptions of all the Netherlands, 11 from 
Germany, Lancashire in the United Kingdom and Östra Mellansverige in Sweden 
which, nevertheless, and has already been highlighted (tables 1 and 2), have managed 
to extend their industrial base thanks to this spurt in productivity.
That means the regions have been able to compensate for the negative effect 
of the delocation process on the employment from a shrinking manufacturing base 
by allocating more resources inside the other sectors (figure 5). But, in addition to 
creating employment in other activities, two-thirds of these regions (10 from the 
United Kingdom, 5 from Germany, 4 from France, 3 from Italy, the two Danish ones, 
Oost-Vlaanderen in Belgium and Sydsverige in Sweden) have reacted in the face of 
delocation by increasing their industrial productivity, as was stated previously. As a 
result, the good news is that in all the regions considered it is possible to discover an 
active response to delocation, either by setting up industrial restructuring processes 
which tend to eliminate the least efficient production, or by raising productivity and/
or replacing employment in manufacturing by employment in other sectors.
5.    Concluding Remarks
A comparative analysis of industrial location patterns for a large sample of Eu-
ropean regions —characterized by having an upper-middle level income and a strong 
industrial sector—, during the last few years, has revealed that only half of them have 
shown locational attractions for manufacturing activities. The regional patterns found 
clearly show the influence of «national effect», the regions showing location effects 
corresponding to most of those located in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Finland, Sweden, Spain and Greece.
On the contrary, the delocation process has affected another half of the regions 
included, most of them French, British and Italian. Therefore, delocation has con-
tributed to concentrating the European manufacturing industry in the areas with the 
highest market potential, in the centre of continental Europe. It has contributed, fur-
thermore to relocating manufacturing activities inside every country, something that 
requires further analysis from future research.
Attractiveness for the location of manufacturing industries has been encouraged 
by significant increases in labor productivity, so in most of the regions showing posi-
tive location patterns production increases have been compatible with a decline in 
aggregate manufacturing total employment. More specifically, in this situation are all 
regions in the Netherlands, Finland, Greece and Ireland, three quarters of the German 
ones, two from the United Kingdom, two from Sweden and Madrid in Spain.
On the contrary, in the regions where delocation has taken place the increase in 
industrial labour productivity has been lower. In fact twelve of such regions show 
reductions in labour productivity, five of them located in France, three Italian, the 
British Eastern Scotland and Greater London, Västsverige in Sweden and the Belgian 
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Antwerp. Besides, the positive impact of this rare performance on employment has 
been largely offset by destruction of industrial activity, except in the Île de France 
and Midi-Pyrénées, the two territories in which productivity has a more negative 
trajectory.
Figure 5.  Employment growth rates in selected regions, 2001-2005: 
manufacturing and the other sectors (percentages)
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The positive link between location and manufacturing labour productivity in-
crease confirms the result obtained by other authors, particularly Cuadrado-Roura 
et al. (2002), who, referring their analysis to previous years, distinguish two groups 
of winners among the European regions, the first grouping regions with increased 
employment and labour productivity, perhaps reflecting the success of technological 
and organizational changes introduced during the period, promoting the diversifica-
tion and specialization in activities with high growth levels and attracting new invest-
ments less labour-intensive, and a second one formed by regions capable of imple-
menting restructuring processes to eliminate the most inefficient outputs, achieve 
higher levels of productivity and increased industrial production, at the expense of a 
notable decline in employment.
Nevertheless, discrepancies in delocation patterns outlined above and different 
achievements in terms of productivity improvement have not only been the result 
of companies» response to intensified competition in each region, but also of di-
fferential features. On the one hand is size, which in larger regions, like some of Italy, 
Germany, France and Spain, reduces the chances of scoring high growth rates. On the 
other hand, are the national specificities, such as the massive migrations received by 
the Spanish regions, a key to explain their model of industrial growth and the diffe-
rent public policies. The influence of the two latter factors appears remarkable, given 
the similarities among the location patterns of each of the regions examined and the 
Member States they belong to.
Anyway, the lack of data has prevented us from going further into a preliminary 
explanatory analysis of the delocation patters found when looking at the different 
manufacturing activities but the role played by the IT manufacturing sector and other 
branches affected by intense international competition (automobile, clothes and tex-
tiles and shoes) might have been important.
Finally, we would just like to point out that the regions have been able to com-
pensate for the negative effect of the industrial delocation process on the employment 
by creating jobs in the other sectors. But, in addition, two-thirds of these regions have 
reacted in the face of delocation by increasing their industrial productivity. Thus, 
the result is that in all the regions considered in this paper it is possible to discover 
an active response to increasing competition in the international markets, either by 
extending their industrial base thanks to productivity increases, or by raising produc-
tivity and/or replacing employment in manufacturing by employment in other areas 
of activity.
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Appendix 1.  European regions NUTS 2 in the sample
Code 
NUTS 2
Region name 
and country to which it belong
Code 
NUTS 2
Region name 
and country to which it belong
at22 Steiermark es21 País Vasco
at31 Oberösterreich es30 Comunidad de Madrid
Austria es51 Cataluña
Spain
be21 Prov. Antwerpen
be23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen fi18 Etelä-Suomi
Belgium fi19 Länsi-Suomi
Finland
de11 Stuttgart
de12 Karlsruhe fr10 Île de France
de13 Freiburg fr23 Haute-Normandie
de14 Tübingen fr24 Centre
de21 Oberbayern fr42 Alsace
de22 Niederbayern fr51 Pays de la Loire
de23 Oberpfalz fr52 Bretagne
de24 Oberfranken fr61 Aquitaine
de25 Mittelfranken fr62 Midi-Pyrénées
de26 Unterfranken fr71 Rhône-Alpes
de27 Schwaben fr82 Provence-Alpes-Côted’Azur
de60 Hamburg France
de71 Darmstadt
de73 Kassel gr30  Attiki
de91 Braunschweig Greece
de92 Hannover
dea1 Düsseldorf ie02 Southern and Eastern
dea2 Köln Ireland
dea4 Detmold
dea5 Arnsberg itc1 Piemonte
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz itc4 Lombardia
dec0 Saarland itd3 Veneto
def0 Schleswig-Holstein itd5 Emilia-Romagna
Germany ite1 Toscana
ite3 Marche
dk01 Hovedstaden ite4 Lazio
dk04 Midtjylland Italy
Denmark
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Code 
NUTS 2
Region name 
and country to which it belong
Code 
NUTS 2
Region name 
and country to which it belong
nl22 Gelderland uke4 West Yorkshire
nl32 Noord-Holland ukf1 Derbyshireand Nottinghamshire
nl33 Zuid-Holland ukf2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northant
nl41 Noord-Brabant ukg3 West Midlands
Netherlands ukh1 East Anglia
uki1 Inner London
se11 Stockholm uki2 Outer London
se12 Östra Mellansverige ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire
se22 Sydsverige ukj3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight
se23 Västsverige ukk1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol
Sweden ukm2 Eastern Scotland
ukm3 South Western Scotland
ukd3 Greater Manchester United Kingdom
ukd4 Lancashire
Appendix 2.  GDP per Capita and region’s share in EU-15 manufacturing GVA, 
2005
Manufacturing GVA 
(% of total EU-15)
GDPpc 
(Index, EU-15=100)
at22 Steiermark 0.40 96.47
at31 Oberösterreich 0.63 106.41
be21 Prov. Antwerpen 0.64 127.80
be23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 0.40 95.89
de11 Stuttgart 2.41 122.96
de12 Karlsruhe 1.32 116.74
de13 Freiburg 0.99 100.18
de14 Tübingen 0.95 107.80
de21 Oberbayern 2.05 146.84
de22 Niederbayern 0.51 100.90
de23 Oberpfalz 0.46 104.75
de24 Oberfranken 0.47 98.85
de25 Mittelfranken 0.79 120.22
de26 Unterfranken 0.56 102.83
de27 Schwaben 0.84 105.93
Appendix 1.  (Continue)
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Manufacturing GVA 
(% of total EU-15)
GDPpc 
(Index, EU-15=100)
de60 Hamburg 0.62 179.22
de71 Darmstadt 1.30 139.85
de73 Kassel 0.41 100.06
de91 Braunschweig 0.81 96.75
de92 Hannover 0.58 100.00
dea1 Düsseldorf 1.76 113.97
dea2 Köln 1.29 103.87
dea4 Detmold 0.85 97.42
dea5 Arnsberg 1.43 93.95
deb3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 0.82 95.05
dec0 Saarland 0.40 97.78
def0 Schleswig-Holstein 0.61 90.99
dk01 Hovedstaden 0.43 182.87
dk04 Midtjylland 0.41 135.81
es21 País Vasco 0.70 99.77
es30 Comunidad de Madrid 0.93 102.13
es51 Cataluña 1.80 93.10
fi18 Etelä-Suomi 1.23 130.09
fi19 Länsi-Suomi 0.64 99.54
fr10 Île de France 2.21 158.21
fr23 Haute-Normandie 0.43 93.33
fr24 Centre 0.52 92.11
fr42 Alsace 0.48 96.64
fr51 Pays de la Loire 0.72 93.53
fr52 Bretagne 0.51 91.24
fr61 Aquitaine 0.44 92.76
fr62 Midi-Pyrénées 0.40 92.21
fr71 Rhône-Alpes 1.40 103.49
fr82 Provence-Alpes-Côted’Azur 0.55 97.15
gr30  Attiki 0.39 91.44
ie02 Southern and Eastern 1.96 160.68
itc1 Piemonte 1.28 99.73
itc4 Lombardia 3.90 118.63
itd3 Veneto 1.76 107.47
itd5 Emilia-Romagna 1.64 111.32
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Manufacturing GVA 
(% of total EU-15)
GDPpc 
(Index, EU-15=100)
ite1 Toscana 0.90 99.29
ite3 Marche 0.47 90.78
ite4 Lazio 0.62 111.23
nl22 Gelderland 0.43 98.92
nl32 Noord-Holland 0.51 138.04
nl33 Zuid-Holland 0.77 120.03
nl41 Noord-Brabant 0.98 117.22
se11 Stockholm 0.62 170.37
se12 Östra Mellansverige 0.56 104.33
se22 Sydsverige 0.44 108.65
se23 Västsverige 0.74 117.43
ukd3 Greater Manchester 0.55 103.74
ukd4 Lancashire 0.46 91.61
uke4 West Yorkshire 0.54 103.78
ukf1 Derbyshireand Nottinghamshire 0.65 102.83
ukf2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northant 0.53 111.79
ukg3 West Midlands 0.71 105.96
ukh1 East Anglia 0.50 101.69
uki1 Inner London 0.67 285.35
uki2 Outer London 0.55 102.31
ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire 0.58 158.36
ukj3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 0.43 113.34
ukk1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol 0.61 126.28
ukm2 Eastern Scotland 0.44 109.47
ukm3 South Western Scotland 0.53 100.97
Source: Elaborated from Eurostat and National Statistical offices.
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Appendix 3.  Location effect and productivity growth rates in European 
manufacturing sector (percentages)
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